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Local Differential Privacy and Its Applications: A
Comprehensive Survey
Mengmeng Yang, Lingjuan Lyu, Jun Zhao, Tianqing Zhu, Kwok-Yan Lam
Abstract—With the fast development of Information Technology, a tremendous amount of data have been generated and collected for
research and analysis purposes. As an increasing number of users are growing concerned about their personal information, privacy
preservation has become an urgent problem to be solved and has attracted significant attention. Local differential privacy (LDP), as a
strong privacy tool, has been widely deployed in the real world in recent years. It breaks the shackles of the trusted third party, and
allows users to perturb their data locally, thus providing much stronger privacy protection. This survey provides a comprehensive and
structured overview of the local differential privacy technology. We summarise and analyze state-of-the-art research in LDP and
compare a range of methods in the context of answering a variety of queries and training different machine learning models. We
discuss the practical deployment of local differential privacy and explore its application in various domains. Furthermore, we point out
several research gaps, and discuss promising future research directions.
Index Terms—differential privacy, local differential privacy, privacy-preserving
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Due to the promise of data-driven decision-making is
now being recognized broadly, the collection of user data
has increased dramatically over the last few years. However,
the collected information from users is generally private
and sensitive, which can be easily linked to other highly
confidential details. Users raise the privacy concern over
their personal data, especially after the emergence of the
new technology for the in-depth mining and analysis of
the users’ data. Various countries have enacted privacy laws
to regulate the actives of the organization with users’ data,
such as General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [1], Cal-
ifornia Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) [2] and Personal Data
Protection Act (PDPA) [3]. Privacy preservation, therefore,
becomes an urgent issue that needs to be addressed.
Differential privacy was proposed by Dwork et al. [4],
and has emerged as an de facto standard for preserving
privacy in a variety of areas. The traditional differential
privacy, also named centralized differential privacy (CDP),
collects the user’s original data first and then releases the
perturbed aggregated information to the public user. It
assumes the data curator is trusted, which is not always
the case in the real world. Even the big reputable com-
pany cannot guarantee its customer’s privacy. For example,
Google exposed the private data of hundreds of thousands
of users of the Google+ social network in 2018. In 2019,
more than 267 million Facebook users had their user IDs,
phone numbers, and names exposed online [5]. Reported
in Feb, 2020, personal data of all 6.5 million Israeli voters
is exposed because of the elector app flaw, including full
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Fig. 1: Comparison of two differential privacy models
names, addresses, and identity card numbers, which raises
concerns about identity theft and electoral manipulation [6].
Therefore, it is difficult to find a fully trusted third party to
manage the users’ data.
To solve this problem, local differential privacy (LDP)
[7] was proposed. It perturbs the user’s data locally before
the data leaves the users’ devices. Only the data owner can
access the original data, which provides much stronger pri-
vacy protection for the user. Fig. 1 shows the comparison of
the framework of centralized differential privacy and local
differential privacy. For centralized differential privacy, the
data curator possess the users’ true data. While under the
local differential privacy model, the curator holds the per-
turbed data instead of the raw data, the query is performed
on the perturbed dataset. Therefore, local differential pri-
vacy prevents the privacy disclosure from the untrusted
data curator and relieves the burden on the trusted data
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curator to keep data secure.
LDP received a significant amount of attention and has
been deployed by many big companies [8–10] to preserve
users’ privacy. However, it adds too much noise to the whole
dataset, which results in much lower utility compared with
central model and each user only has a local view of the
data, which limits the scope of its application. Therefore, the
local differential privacy has been much less studied than
the central one. In order to summarize the state-of-the-art
and to benefit future research, we are motived to provide
a survey about current work in this field. Though there
exist surveys on LDP, they only provide partial pictures. For
example, Zhao et al. [11] mainly investigate the potential
applications of LDP in securing the internet of connected
vehicles. Bebensee [12] focuses on heavy hitter identification
and spatial data collection. Cormode et al. [13] provide a
brief tutorial on LDP. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work that comprehensively studied the research
over local differential privacy, including its technologies and
applications.
Specifically, we identify two research directions accord-
ing to the dependency of data perturbation mechanism:
statistical query with LDP and private learning with LDP.
For statistic query with LDP, the aggregator aims to collect
users’ data to answer a specific query, such as frequency,
mean, and range. While the data perturbation mechanism
is designed based on the specific query type. For private
learning with LDP, the aggregator aims to collaborate with
users to train a model, which is associated with particular
machine learning algorithms, such as linear regression and
SVM. The data perturbation mechanism is dependent on
the specific machine learning algorithm. We point out the
research problem and identify the unit challenge for each
statistic query and model training under local differential
privacy protection. We list and review the related methods
and techniques, and analyze their advantages and disadvan-
tages. Besides, we discuss the practical deployment of LDP
and explore the latest research progress over the develop-
ment of LDP’s applications, including federated learning,
reinforcement learning, social network, location privacy,
and recommendation system. Furthermore, according to the
latest research and character of LDP, we identify the research
gaps and discuss the research directions in the near further.
This survey is structured as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce some preliminaries. The review of exiting LDP
techniques for statistic query and machine learning are
presented in Section 3 and Section 4 respectively. Section
5 explored the application of LDP. Section 6 provides an
extensive discussion on research gap and research directions
for LDP research. We finally conclude this survey in Section
7.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Notations
Let V be the user’s record with d attributes, which samples
from a finite data universe X . We consider a set of n
users, where each user ui has one or some items vj ∈ V .
Each user needs to report his value to the aggregator for
analysis purpose. Local differential privacy aims to hide the
user’s true value by perturbing the report while ensuring
statistical accuracy. The local differential privacy is achieved
by a mechanismM, which is a randomized algorithm that
perturbs the user’s true value as a random value tˆ. The
aggregator collects tˆ and estimates the true statistics. Table
1 summarizes the notations used in the following sections.
TABLE 1: Notations
Notation Description Notation Description
`(·) Loss function n The number of users
v User’s value Ψ Estimation algorithm
t Encoded value H Hash function Universe
tˆ Perturbed value p, q Perturbation probability
A Attribute g Number of segment
Ii Items of attribute C Cartesian product
c(I) Count of I M,Φ Randomized algorithm
r User’s report w Output model
f Frequency α, β Accuracy parameter
H Hash function h Hypothesis
 Privacy budget δ confidence parameter
2.2 Local Differential privacy
Definition 1 (-Local Differential Privacy [14]). A random-
ized algorithmM satisfies -local differential privacy, if
and only if for any pair of input values v, v′ ∈ D and for
any possible output S ⊆ Range(M), we have
Pr[M(v) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[M(v′) ∈ S].
The perturbation mechanism M is applied to each user
record independently.
The majority of local differential privacy mechanisms
are based on the idea of randomized response [15], which
was proposed by Warner et al. as a survey technology to
eliminate the evasive answer bias.
Definition 2 (Randomized Response (RR)). Let v be a user’s
binary value, tˆ be the response Then, for any v,
Pr[tˆ = v] =
{
e
e+1 , if t = v
1
e+1 , if t 6= v
. (1)
The randomized response outputs the true value with
probability e

e+1 and outputs the opposite value with prob-
ability 1e+1 . Holohan et al. [16] show that the output
probability of Eq. 1 minimises estimator error. However,
the traditional randomized response is only suitable for the
binary attribute. To make it suitable for a larger domain, a
generalized randomized response (GRR) is proposed [17].
Definition 3 (Generalized Randomized Response (GRR)).
Given a user u with a value v ∈ R, where R is a set of
d possible true values that a user can have. A random
variable, denote by tˆ, represents the response of a user
u with sample space R. The generalized randomized
response works as follow:
Pr[tˆ = v] =
{
e
e+d−1 , if t = v
1
e+d−1 , if t 6= v
. (2)
When the data dimension d = 2, the generalized random-
ized response is consistent with the traditional randomized
response.
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Adding Laplace or Gaussian noise to the data record
achieves LDP as well. It is more used for continuous nu-
merical data statistics. The definition is shown as follows.
Definition 4 (Laplace mechanism). Given a function f :
D → R over a dataset D, the Laplace mechanism is
defined as:
f̂(D) = f(D) + Laplace(
s

),
Definition 5 (Gaussian mechanism). Given a function f :
D → R over a dataset D, the Gaussian mechanism is
defined as:
f̂(D) = f(D) +N (u, σ2s2),
where s is the sensitivity. Usually, a clipping technique
[18] or truncation are adopted to bound the sensitivity to
achieve a better performance.
Since the local differential privacy is based on the theory
of differential privacy, the sequential composition property
of differential privacy applies to local differential privacy.
Theorem 1 (Sequential Composition [19]). Suppose a
method includes m independent randomized func-
tions M = {M1,M2, ...,Mm}, each Mi provides i-
local differential privacy guarantee, then M satisfies
(
∑m
i=1 i)-local differential privacy.
More sophisticated algorithms can be achieved based
on the sequential composition property. Specifically, the
aggregator can apply a series of local differential privacy
mechanisms, assign a portion of privacy budget to each of
them, the series of mechanisms as a whole satisfies -local
differential privacy.
2.3 Data aggregation under LDP
LDP-perturbed value is randomized and no longer holds
any significance, but the aggregates like average across large
numbers of participants still do. Therefore, the application
of LDP is based on the aggregation over a large volume
of participants. Data aggregation under local differential
privacy mainly includs four processes: Encoding, Pertur-
bation, Aggregation, and Estimation. The majority of LDP
algorithms follow this aggregation process, which is shown
in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2: Data flow of statistics under LDP
• Encoding. The user encodes the original value v to t
according to the predefined coding scheme, which
makes it adapted to the perturbation mechanism.
The encoded t can be a value or a binary vector.
• Perturbation. The encoded value t is perturbed by the
randomized algorithm that achieves local differential
privacy, which guarantees that the user’s value can-
not be distinguished with any other values.
• Aggregation. The aggregator collects all the perturbed
value tˆ from users and aggregates them accordingly.
• Estimation. The aggregator estimates the query re-
sult according to the perturbation strategy to en-
sure statistical unbiased, and may utilize some post-
processing techniques to improve estimation accu-
racy.
3 STATISTICAL QUERY WITH LDP
Capture simple queries is a very useful primitive in build-
ing more complicated data analyses, which help service
provider to better understand the needs of populations
and offer more effective and reliable services. The statistical
query under LDP mainly focuses on frequency, mean, and
range.
3.1 Frequency estimation
Frequency estimation is one of the basic statistical goals
under local differential privacy protection. The frequency
estimation mainly focuses on discrete data, such as the
non-numerical data. We identify four types of frequency
estimation: the general frequency estimation, heavy hitters
identification, frequency estimation over set value data, and
the joint distribution estimation. Fig. 3 shows the taxonomy
tree of this section and lists the typical methods proposed
in the literature for each type of frequency estimation. We
review these methods one by one.
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Fig. 3: Taxonomy tree of frequency estimation
3.1.1 General frequency estimation
We refer the general frequency estimation to the situation
that each user only has one item of an attribute. Specifically,
given a set of users U = {u1, . . . , un} and an attribute A
with d items that A = {I1, . . . , Id}. Each user uj has an
item Ii ∈ A. The data collector aims to get the statistics
of the frequency of each item in A, noted as fi = c(Ii)/n,
i ∈ d, where c(Ii) is the number of users whose value equals
to item Ii. The count number of c(Ii) can be estimated by
using following equation for any LDP algorithm.
cˆ(Ii) =
∑n
j=1 1tˆΦj (Ii)− nq∗
p∗ − q∗ , (3)
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TABLE 2: Comparison of frequency estimation methods
Method Typical papers Description Advantages Disadvantages
Direct
perturbation [17], [20]
Perform the randomized response directly to the
encoded value
Easy to perform and
no additional computa-
tional cost
Poor performance when
the dimension is high
Hash [8], [20]
Hash the high dimension true value to a much
smaller dimension, apply the randomized re-
sponse to the hashed value
Reduce the communica-
tion cost
Decoding process is
complex and collision
problem needs to be
considered
Transformation [21], [22] Transform the user value into a single bit, per-form the randomized response to this bit
Small communication
cost
Additional information
loss during the transfor-
mation process
Subset selection [23], [24] Randomly choose k value to report
Good performance in
the intermediate pri-
vacy region
High communication
cost
where tˆΦj is the perturbed output of user uj by an algorithm
Φ, 1tˆΦj (Ii) is an indicator function, which is equal to 1
when tˆΦj = Ii, and 0 otherwise. p
∗ and q∗ are perturbation
probabilities.
The research focus of general frequency estimation is
the perturbation mechanism design. Usually, the target of
perturbation is to make the expectation of the estimation
unbiased, and reduce the statistical variance as much as
possible. This is quite challenging, especially for high di-
mensional data. Some extra measures are usually adopted
to improve the accuracy. For example, the estimated item
frequency can be further calibrated by incorporating the
prior knowledge about the noise and item distribution [25].
Post-processing results to make them consistent by adding
constraints that all estimations are non-negative and sum up
to 1 can also improve the estimation [26, 27].
A pair of algorithms < Φ,Ψ >, where Φ is the
randomized algorithm used by each user to perturb his
input value and Ψ is the estimation method (e.g. Eq. 3) used
by the aggregator, enables the aggregators to estimate the
frequency of any given value v ∈ R under local differential
privacy is named frequency oracle (FO) in the literature [28].
Frequency oracles are widely used as building blocks for
other complicated queries and applications. We classify the
typical FOs into following groups.
Direct perturbation. RR can be applied to the binary
attribute collection directly. GRR is used for the attribute
with d possible values. Wang et al. [20] propose an
Optimized Unary Encoding (OUE) method, which has
a better performance when the attribute has a higher
dimension. OUE encodes the true value as a length d binary
vector, Encode(v) = [0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0], where only the
v-th position is 1. Each bit is performed the randomized
response with probability p = 12 and q =
1
e+1 .
Discussion: RR and GRR are suitable for statistics over
lower dimensional data. OUE reduces the statistical vari-
ance for high dimensional data at the cost high communica-
tion cost. RR, GRR, and OUE are three most basic building
blocks for other methods.
Hash-based method. Erlingsson et al.’s [8] RAPPOR is a
typical hash-based frequency statistical method with local
differential privacy protection. Given a hash function H
selected randomly from a universal hash function family H,
the user’s value v is represented as < H,H(v) >. RAPPOR
encodes the hash value H(v) as a length k bit vector. Then
the randomized response is performed on each bit of the
hashed vector. The aggregator utilizes Lasso regression [29]
to learn the value frequency from the collected reports to
improve the estimation accuracy, which latter was proved
substantially inefficient by Chai and Nayak [30]. Similarly,
Wang et al. [20] propose optimal local hash (OLH) method.
OLH uses optimized choices for the range of hash functions
and performs the GRR to the hashed value.
Discussion: Before perturbation, the hash function maps
the input value with large domain size into a smaller do-
main size, which reduces the communication cost and sta-
tistical variance, but brings collision problem. Bloom Filter
[8] and Count Mean Sketch [22] are two common ways used
to reduce the effect of the collision. To further reduce the
chance of collisions, Erlingsson et al. [8] propose to assign
the users permanently to m cohorts, each of which has a
different set of hash functions. All these remedies reduce the
potential effect of collisions, but increases the computational
complexity of the decoding process.
Transformation-based method. Given a random matrix
Φ ∈ Rm×d, let ei ∈ Rd be the standard basis vector with
v′th position equals to 1, each column vector θ = Φei ∈ Rm
of Φ represents a value v ∈ A. Each user randomly choose
an index j ∈ [m] and report < j, θˆj > to the aggregator.
The aggregator gets a length m vector G by aggregating
all the reports and recovers the frequency of value vi by
calculating the inner product between the aggregation G
and the representation of the value vector Φei. Bassily and
Smith [21] use a random matrix Φ ∈ {− 1√
m
, 1√
m
}m×d to
map the user’s value, we name it Johnson-Lindenstrauss
randomized response (JLRR) in the following sections. Be-
sides, Hadamard transform [22, 31] has been considered as
well. The transformation matrix Φ is a orthogonal, symmet-
ric 2d × 2d matrix with Φ[i, j] = 2−d/2(−1)<i,j>. We name
the Hadamard matrix based method as Hadamard random
response (HRR).
Discussion: Transformation-based method transforms the
user’s value from d bits to only 1 bit. On the one hand,
it reduces communication cost significantly. On the other
hand, one bit data might not represent the complete input
information. The accuracy can be affected, especially when
the privacy budget  is big, the information loss during the
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TABLE 3: Comparison among typical techniques for frequency estimation
Technique Encoding Perturbation Variance Communication
GRR [17] t = v Pr[tˆ = v] =
{
e
e+d−1 , if t = v
1
e+d−1 , if t 6= v
O
(
d−2+e
(e−1)2
)
log d
OUE [20] t = [0, · · · , 1, · · · , 0],where t[v] = 1 Pr[tˆ[i] = 1] =
{
1
2
, if t[i] = 1
1
e+1
, if t[i] = 0
O
(
4e
(e−1)2
)
d
RAPPOR [8]
r =< H, t >;
H ∈ H;
t = [0, · · · , 1, · · ·]
where t[i] =
{
1, if H(v) = 1,
0, otherwise
Pr[tˆ[i] = 1] =
{
1− 1
2
f, if t[i] = 1
1
2
f, if t[i] = 0
,
where f = 2
e/2+1
O
(
e/2
(e/2−1)2
)
logm
OLH [20]
r =< H, t >;
H ∈ H;
t = H(v)
Pr[tˆ = H(v)] =
{
e
e+g−1 , if t = H(v)
1
e+g−1 , if t 6= H(v)
,
where g = e + 1
O
(
4e
(e−1)2
)
logn
JLRR [21]
Φ ∈ {− 1√
m
, 1√
m
}m×d;
r =< i, t >;
i ∈ [m];
t = Φ[i, v]
tˆ =
{
cdt, w.p.
e
e+1
−cdt, w.p. 1e+1
,
where c = e
+1
e−1
O
(
4e
(e−1)2
)
logm
HRR [22, 31]
Φ : 2d × 2d Hadamard Matrix,
where Φ[i, j] = 2−d/2(−1)<i,j>;
r =< i, t >;
i ∈ [2d];
t = Φ[i, v]
Pr[tˆ = 1] =
{
e
e+1
, if t = 1
1
e+1
, if t = −1 O
(
4e
(e−1)2
)
O(1)
transformation process dominates the statistic error.
Subset selection The general idea of subset selection is ran-
domly select k items within the domain size. The user’s true
item is included in the k-subset with a specified probability.
Wang et al. [23] get the optimal subset size k = b de+1c
or k = d de+1e by minimizing variance. Later, they extend
the k-subset mechanism to tackle discrete quantitative data
with arbitrary distance metric by proposing a variant of
the Exponential Mechanism (EM) using a trivial output
as padding [32]. Ye and Alexander [24] provide a much
detailed analysis of the k-subset mechanism in the medium
privacy regime and provided a tight lower bound on the
minimax risk.
Discussion. Subset selection method shows a good
performance in the intermediate privacy region (e.g.
log 2 ≤  ≤ log(d − 1)) [23] compared with GRR. But the
communication cost is relatively high, especially when  is
small.
Summary The frequency estimation is the most basic
statistic and the most mature study over local differential
privacy. The main challenges of frequency estimation are
to alleviate the effect of high dimensional data and reduce
communication cost without sacrificing statistical accuracy
too much. To provide a much intuitive comparison among
these techniques, we summarise these methods in Table 2
and list the typical techniques in Table 3. The perturbation
methods are adaptively selected according to different
application requirements. For example, GRR is preferred
for low dimensional data statistic and transformation-based
methods are more used in situations requiring small
communication, such as in the IoT area.
3.1.2 Heavy hitters identification
The aim of heavy hitter identification is to find the items
with frequency over a threshold. For example, find the
items whose frequency is larger than 10%. Heavy hitter
identification is a basic research problem in data analytics
with many applications, such as frequent item mining,
trend monitoring, and marketing analysis. Heavy hitters
can be identified by using frequency oracle directly, we
name it naive method. Or, we combine other algorithms
with frequency oracle to make the process much efficient,
such as partition-based method and tree-based method.
Table 4 summaries these methods.
Naive method. As the heavy hitters are the items with the
frequency over a threshold, the aggregator can collect the
user’s data and compute the frequency for each item using
frequency oracle, then find out the heavy hitters.
Discussion. Naive method is an effective solution for
heavy hitter identification for low dimensional data. But it is
inefficient for high dimensional data. For example, assume
there are 1000 websites in total, the aggregator wants to
know the top-10 frequently visited ones, he needs to query
21000 times to get the answer just using frequency oracle.
And the statistical variance would be very high, which
reduces the statistical accuracy significantly.
Partition-based method Partition-based method tries to
find the frequent ones without going through all the pos-
sible values. Specifically, the user’s data is encoded as a
binary vector using one-hot encoding. Each user reports a
segment of the perturbed vector to the aggregator. If the
user’s vector is partitioned into g segments, each user only
needs to report s = d/g bits. The principle is that if a
value is frequent, the segment of the value is also frequent.
The aggregator finds the frequent strings in each segment
denotes as Ci and then calculates the Cartesian product of
Ci as C = C1 ×C2 × ...×Cg . The frequent items are found
in the candidate set C . To further reduce the size of the
candidate set C , Fanti et al. [33] let the users report two
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TABLE 4: Comparison of heavy hitter identification methods
Method Typical papers Description Advantages Disadvantages
Naive method [17], [20] Apply the frequency oracle, compute frequency
of all times, then find the top-k frequent ones
Easy to perform and no
additional computation
Not efficient
Partition-based
method
[33],[34] Partition the true vector into small non-
overlapping or overlapping segments, ran-
domly choose one or few segments, apply ran-
domized response to each bit of the vector
High efficient for heavy
hitter estimation
Additional computa-
tion cost, low accuracy
Tree-based
method
[35], [19] Iteratively statistic the vector, prune the less
frequent prefixes before growing the tree.
Find the frequent items
efficiently, donot need
to know the domain
size
Need multiple iteration
segments randomly instead of one. A potential problem of
partition is that if the number of segment g is big, there
will be a small group of users report the same segment,
which reduces the statistical accuracy. Wang et al. [34] solve
this problem by having the segments overlapping. That is,
they let the users in each group report a prefix of their
value with predefined length. Then the aggregator finds the
frequent items iteratively. Kim et al. [36] propose a similar
method to find frequent words from users’ keystroke data.
Specifically, each user appends a hash value to the word
(enable integrity checking) and sends one random segment
(the segment can start form any position of the word string,
and there are partial overlapping between segments) to the
server. The server selects the frequent strings of the segment
and combines candidate segments per position side-by- side
following the chain rule.
Discussion. Partition-based method increases the effi-
ciency of heavy hitters estimation by reducing the query
times from 2d to 2sg (if report one segment). However, it
increases the other computational cost, such as the construc-
tion of the candidate set. Besides, the candidates obtained
from the segments often do not correspond to real terms,
which affects the accuracy of heavy hitter estimation.
Tree-based method The tree-based method is mainly used
for ’string data’, such as trajectory and English word. The
frequent item is identified by iteratively constructing a tree
under LDP, each node represents a prefix of an item and
less frequent prefixes are pruned during each iteration.
Similar to partition-based method, the principle of tree-
based method is that all prefix of a frequent item must be
frequent as well, which enables effective pruning. Therefore,
the statistical computation of heavy hitters is much more
efficient. As each item includes multiple characters, the
domain size is very high, the estimated frequency may not
be as accurate as expected. To solve this problem, Bassily
et al. [35] invoke the local randomizer twice in the full
protocol, once during the pruning process where the high-
frequency items are identified, and a second time during
the estimation phase, invokes the frequency oracle once
more on those particular items to enable the protocol to
get a better estimation. Wang et al. [19] present a candidate
set construction method for each node on the tree, which
restricts that each user can only report one time to the nodes
on his own path to save the privacy budget.
Discussion: Tree-based method can find the frequent
items efficiently and users do not need to know the domain
size of data. The drawback is the algorithm needs multiple
iterations, which increase the communication cost and
delay. Besides, currently, the main method to reduce the
statistical variance is to partition users to disjoint groups.
When the data dimension is large, the insufficient number
of users in each group reduce the accuracy as well.
Summary. The main challenge for heavy hitter identification
is how to find the heavy hitters efficiently, and with
accuracy. The basic idea of current method is to remove
some infrequent items step by step. On the one hand, it
solved the efficiency problem, but on the other hand, it
introduces new problems, such as complex computation
or high communication costs. To further improve the
performance of heavy hitter identification is remain a
challenge.
3.1.3 Frequency estimation over set value data
Set-value data contains a collection of items. Specifically,
each user has a set of up to ` items (e.g., web pages browsed,
movies watched, locations visited) instead of one. Two types
of statistical queries are considered in the literature, find
the items with frequency over f and find the itemsets with
frequency over f , which correspond to two data mining
tasks, heavy hitters identification and frequent itemset min-
ing (FIM).
Heavy hitters identification over set value data. The main
challenge for identifying the heavy hitters over set value
data is that the set-value data has heterogeneous size. That
is, each user may have 0 to l items, which makes it difficult
to access the item sample probability, then make accurate
frequency estimation difficult.
Currently, the problem of heterogeneous size is solved by
trimming and padding [37, 38]. Specifically, the aggregator
assumes the variable m to be the largest number of user’s
size of the set-valued data. If the number of items in user’s
set-valued data is beyond m, the data is simply truncated
to m items. If the number of items in user’s set-valued data
is under m, dummy items are added to achieve m. Then
each user samples one item randomly to report. To enhance
accuracy, Qin et al. [37] propose LDPMiner, which is a two-
phase mechanism. A candidate set of top-k frequent items is
identified using a portion of the privacy budget in the first
phase. The remaining budget is used to refine the candidate
set in a second phase. Wang et al. [28] utilize the privacy
amplification of sampling to save privacy budget. As the
privacy mechanisms used in both [28, 37] are the same as
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TABLE 5: Typical papers for set-value data collection
Protocol Task Key methods Advantages Disadvantages
LDPMiner [37] Find frequentitems Refine the candidate set Easy to implement Only works when k is small
PrivSet [38] Find frequentitems Output a subset of the items The result can be quite accurate
More communication cost and
inefficient to chose the size of
subset
SVSM [28] Find frequentitemsets
Construct candidate sets using
guessed frequency based on the
estimated frequent items
Small size of the candidate sets
reduces the statical variance
Extra error introduced due to
the partitioning of the users and
guessed frequency
the LDP mechanism for general frequency estimation, the
privacy budget is unable to be fully utilized for set-value
data collection. Wang et al. [38] propose to output a subset
of the items using Exponential Mechanism without splitting
the privacy budget, which results in a better accuracy, but
how to choose the size of subset efficiently is still an open
issue.
Frequent itemset mining. Frequent itemset mining aims to
find the itemsets with a frequency over a given threshold.
These itemsets include rich information, which help the
service provider improve the quality of services, such as
understanding the users’ usage pattern and predicting the
user behaviour [39]. While the main challenge for frequent
itemset mining is that it has an extremely large domain,
which results in big statistical variance. Assume there are
totally d different items, the number of possible values of
each user’s set-valued data is
( l
m
)
+
( l
m−1
)
+ · · · + (l0).
Therefore, reducing the candidate set size is a major research
issue for frequent itemset mining. While another challenge
is how to encode the input under the local DP setting.
Due to the challenges of FIM, only Wang et al. [28]
propose a solution under LDP setting. Specifically, they
construct the frequent itemset candidate set based on the
identified frequent items. And then reduce the size of the
candidate set by selecting the itemsets with the highest
guessing frequencies. The intuition is that it is very unlikely
that a frequent itemset is composed of several infrequent
items. However, the splitting of the privacy budget and
guessed frequency increase the statistical errors, which
needs to be further reduced.
Summary. The key feature of set-valued data is that
the user’s data size are heterogeneous. Users whose data
size under m add items to achieve the padding size. As
the added items are fake ones, which cannot contribute to
the statistic. Therefore, the effective samples are reduced
with the increase of the padding size m. However, if the
m is too small, the sampled item may not represent the
user’s real data. The choose of padding size m in the
literature is subjective without theoretical support, which
is still an open problem. The key problem of collecting the
set-value data is that it has a very large domain, especially
for frequent itemset mining. The main challenge is how
to reduce the size of candidate set. Table 5 summaries the
typical protocols for set-value data collection.
3.1.4 Joint distribution estimation
Apart from the frequency estimation for a single attribute,
a more natural and general setting is that each user has
multiple attributes, and the aggregator is interested in the
joint distribution of some of these attributes, which names
marginals. For example, the aggregator might want to
study the association between displayed advertisements
and recently-installed software applications. A variety of
fundamental inference and machine learning tasks also rely
on accurate marginals capturing the correlations [24, 43, 44].
We summarise three methods for joint distribution
estimation as follows.
Naive method The simplest method is that take the
user’s record with multiple attributes as a single item. Then
get the joint distribution of all attributes by performing
frequency oracles. k-way marginal table can be computed
accordingly. However, directly calculate the whole marginal
table has two obvious shortcomings.
• The statistic variance is very high, which is propor-
tional to the domain size of the statistic.
• All the value frequency of attributes need to be
calculated, which cause a high computation cost.
The time complexity and space complexity grow
exponentially with the number of attributes d and
can be prohibitively expensive.
Expectation maximisation (EM)-based method. EM
method allows the users to report the value for each
attribute separately with split privacy budget, then the
marginal table is reconstructed based on the collected noisy
value. Specifically, EM initializes the probability density dis-
tribution of the joint attributes p(a1, a2, ..., ad) as a uniform
distribution. And then, update it iteratively by calculating
pγ+1(a1, a2, ..., ad) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 pγ(a1, a2, ..., ad|tˆi), where
pγ(a1, a2, ..., ad|tˆi) is the posterior probability, which can
be computed by the Bayes’s Theorem, γ is the number of
iteration, and tˆ is the perturbed report. Let Aj be the joint
attribute a1, a2, ..., ad, then,
pγ(Aj |tˆi) = pγ(Aj)p(tˆi|Aj)∑
Aj∈Domain pγ(Aj)p(tˆi|Aj)
(4)
The iterative process stops when the maximum differ-
ence between two estimations is smaller than the specified
threshold. This method is first introduced by Fanti et al. [33]
for estimating joint distribution for two attributes, and then
generalized by Ren et al. [40] to handle multiple attributes.
Discussion: Similarly as the naive solution, EM method
has the advantage of being able to compute k-way marginals
for any k. But the privacy budget is split into each attribute,
which results in a large variance. Therefore, EM algorithm
is not suitable for the high dimensional data, as the domain
size of the joint attributes increases exponentially with the
increase of dimension d as well. EM algorithm achieves
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TABLE 6: Comparison of methods for joint distribution estimation
Method Typicalpaper
Computation
complexity
Communication
cost Variance Advantages Limitations
Naive method – High High 2d · V ar1 • Compute any k-way marginals • High variance• Inefficient
EM [33],[40] High High 2d · V ar • Compute any k-way marginals•Much accurate
• High variance
• Inefficient
Lasso
regression [40] Medium High 2
d · V ar • Compute any k-way marginals•Much efficient • High variance
Fourier
Transformation [41] Medium Low
∑t
i=1
(d
i
) · V ar • Low communication cost • Predefine k
Subset
selection [42] Medium Medium
m
n
· 2` · V ar • Compute any k-way marginals• Low variance • Extra errors
1 V ar is the variance of a single cell in the full contingency table
a better accuracy than the naive method, however, does
not consider the problem of time and space complexity
either. Besides, the EM algorithm relies on the initial value
(initialized distribution), which determines the speed of
convergence. Both work [33] and [40] initialize the joint
distribution as uniform distribution, which is obviously not
optimal for convergence.
Lasso regression-based method Ren et al. [40] model the
joint distribution estimation problem as linear regression.
The method estimates the number of each bit according to
the general randomized response theory as the response
variable y. The distribution is estimated from the noised
sample space by taking advantage of linear regression
y = Mβ, where M is the predictor variables and repre-
sented as Bloom filters. For the d-dimensional data, let mi
be the length of Bloom Filter of each attribute, the size of M
is
∏d
i=1mi, which includes all the possible combinations.
That is M = [H1(a1) × H2(a2) × ... × Hd(ad)]. The joint
distribution estimation can be derived by reshaping the
coefficient vector β into the d-dimensional matrix.
Discussion. Lasso regression-based method improves the
efficiency of the estimation, but does not have any contri-
bution to the estimation accuracy. Based on the estimated
distribution and correlations, the extensions of generating
synthetic dataset are proposed in the literature [40, 45, 46].
Fourier Transform Cormode et al. [41] apply Hadamard
Transformation to publish k-way marginals in the local
setting. Given a vector t ∈ R2d and a Hadamard metric
Φ, the vector t can be represented by the 2d Hadamard
coefficients in the vector θ = Φt. Assume the vector t has the
single 1 at index `, the user only need to randomly select a
coefficient θi = Φi,` to report by randomized response. And
the aggregator only needs
∑k
j=0
(d
j
)
coefficients to calculate
k-way marginal.
Discussion. The advantages of Fourier transform are that
it saves communication cost and has much lower variance
when k is small. However, when k is large, a large number
of coefficients (O(dk)) need to be estimated. Besides, the
method only suitable for binary data and the number of
k needs to be predefined.
Subset Marginal Selection Instead of reporting the value
of all the attributes, an alternative choice is that let each
user report a subset of the attributes. For example, Zhang et
al. [42] propose CALM, which borrows the idea of PriView
method [47] for publishing marginal under the centralized
DP setting. CALM publishes a synopsis of the dataset. The
synopsis takes the form of m size-` marginals, which are
called views. The aggregator chooses a set of m marginals
and FO protocol to be used, then assigns each user to one of
the marginals. The user only needs to report the values of
the attributes included in the marginal he needs to report.
The aggregator calculates the marginal tables according to
users’ report and constructs the k-way marginal.
Discussion: The key highlights of the method are that
it can release any-way marginal table without calculating
the full marginal, and it can deal with the non-binary
attributes. However, it introduces too much error. Besides
the noise error caused by the privacy-preserving, each
estimation of the value is only based on the part of the
users, which introduces the sampling error. Also the
marginal construction process causes the construction error.
Summary. Joint distribution query has a much higher
statistical variance than the frequency estimation for
the single attribute. The marginal statistics (statistic
the distribution over any number of attributes in the
domain) make it much more complicated. The main
research question is how to reduce the computation and
communication cost while enabling any-way marginal
statistics. To make the current research clear, we show the
comparison of the existing methods in Table. 6.
3.2 Mean value estimation
Different from the categorical attributes, the domain of
the numeric attribute is a range, and there are an infinite
number of values. Therefore, the general methods used
for the categorical attribute are not suitable for numeric
attributes. The main application of numerical data collection
is mean value estimation [10]. Assume the input domain of
the numerical values is D = [a, b], each user hold a value
vi ∈ D, the aggregator collects user’s report tˆi and simply
compute the average 1n
∑n
i=1 tˆi. The research focus is on
how to get a much accurate mean value with a much smaller
statistical variance.
3.2.1 General mean value estimation
We refer the general mean value estimation to the
situation that each user has a single numerical value for
each attribute. Currently, there are mainly two types of
randomization for general mean value estimation, extreme
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TABLE 7: Comparison of single numerical attribute collection
Method Perturbation Variance Advantage Disadvantage
Duchi’s [48] Extreme value ( e
+1
e−1 )
2 Easy to encode Accurate statistics
for low privacy regime
The variance cannot be reduced
with the increase of the 
PM [49] Distribution 4e
/2
3(e/2−1)2
Good performance for the whole
range of privacy regime
Sophisticated computation and
hard to encode
TABLE 8: Comparison of multiple numerical attributes collection
Method Perturbation Communication Error
Duchi’s [48] Extreme value for high dimensional data O(d) O(
√
d log d

√
n
)
Harmony [50] Randomly sample one attribute Ai to report.Extreme value perturbation. O(1) O(
√
d log(d/β

√
n
)
PM [49] Randomly sample k attributesDistribution perturbation O(k) O(
√
d log(d/β

√
n
)
values perturbation and distribution perturbation.
Extreme values perturbation. The main idea of extreme
values perturbation is that each user reports one of two
extreme values with a specified probability depending on
the input value v, no matter what v is. The probability
ensures the expectation of the estimated value vˆ equals
to true value v, which provides unbiased mean value
estimation. Given an input t ∈ [−1, 1], Duchi et al.
[14, 48, 51] makes the output equals to either e
+1
e−1 or
− e+1e−1 , with probability e
−1
2e+2 · t + 12 and − e
−1
2e+2 · t + 12
respectively. Besides, Duchi et al. proposed solution for
multiple numerical attribute collection, which takes as
input a tuple t ∈ [−1, 1]d of a user, and outputs a perturbed
vector tˆ ∈ {−B,B}d, where B is a constant decided by d
and .
Extensions. For multiple attributes statistics, based on
Duchi et al. solution, Nguyen et al. [50] propose Harmony,
which randomly chooses one attribute to report instead of
reporting all attribute values. Harmony reaches a similar
statistical variance with Duchi’s but with much smaller
communication cost. Later Akter and Hashem [52] consider
that the user may have a different privacy concern, and
extend Duchi et al.’s solution to satisfy personalized privacy
setting. Wang et al. [46] adjust the output probability of
Duchi et al.’s method for multiple attributes collection,
making it satisfy (, δ)−LDP , which gets a smaller variance.
Discussion. Duchi et al.’s solution offers considerable
smaller variance when  is small, but not very well when 
becomes large, because it’s worst-case variance O(( e
+1
e−1 )
2)
is always over 1 no matter how big the privacy budget is.
Kairouz et al. [53] also prove that this binary mechanism
(two outputs) is not always optimal as  increases. Therefore,
more possible outputs might be explored in the future.
Distribution perturbation. The idea of distribution pertur-
bation is that model the output of the value as a continuous
distribution. Specifically, define an output domain [−s, s],
which is broader than the input domain [−1, 1]. For each
value v, there is an associated rang [`(v), r(v)], where −s ≤
`(v) < r(v) ≤ s. The user with value v outputs the value
vˆ ∈ [`(v), r(v)] with higher probability, and output other
value with lower probability. The method was first proposed
by Wang et al. [49], named Piecewise Mechanism (PM), to
estimate the mean value, which achieves a much smaller
variance compared with Duchi et al.’s solution, especially
when  is big. Extending the single numerical value into
multi-dimensional numeric attributes is also considered in
the paper [49]. The general idea is that randomly sampling
k dimensional data to report instead of all the values.
Extensions. Li et al. [27] propose a similar method with
PM, named Square Wave mechanism, to reconstruct the
distribution instead of calculating the mean value. Given
a input domain [0, 1] and output domain [−b, 1 + b], the
user output vˆ ∈ [v − b, v + b] with probability e2be+1
and output other values with probability 12be+1 . Parameter
b is chosen by maximizing the upper bound of mutual
information between the input and output of the reporting.
As input values are always at the center of high probability
region, Square Wave mechanism cannot provide unbiased
estimation for mean value.
Discussion. The distribution perturbation method gets
a much better accuracy for the high privacy regime. The
short-comings are that it brings sophisticated computation
and hard to encode due to the unlimited number of possible
output.
Summary. Collecting numeric data has not been addressed
sufficiently under local differential privacy protection.
Currently, Duchi’s method and PM are two main solutions.
Other extensions based on these two mechanisms are
all target on mean value estimation as well. Table 7 and
Table 8 show the typical methods for single numerical
value collection and multiple numerical data collection
respectively. Due to the big bias for the single data record,
the designation of algorithms for statistics, such as max,
min, and quantile, is quite challenging.
3.2.2 Mean value estimation over key value data
Key-valued data is a popular NoSQL data model, and is
widely encountered in practice. It is a hybrid data type
that contains both categorical attributes and numerical at-
tributes. And each user may have multiple key-value pairs.
Table 9 shows an example of key-value data. The key is the
movie name, which also can be represented as the movie
ID. The value is the movie rating. Both movie name and
rating should be perturbed to prevent the attacker from
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knowing which movie the user watched or rated and how
many scores the user rated the specific movie.
TABLE 9: Movie dataset
User Movie Rating
u1
The godfather 9.2
Cats 2.8
Knives Out 8.1
u2
Little Women 8.3
Cats 8.8
Uncut Gems 8.1
Star Wars 6.9
Joker 8.7
Usually, we query the frequency of keys and mean
of values under each key simultaneously. The frequency
estimation of keys can be achieved by applying the fre-
quency oracle directly. The main challenge is that there
is an inherent correlation between key and values, which
if not harnessed, will lead to poor utility when querying
the mean values. To keep the correlation between the key
and value, the solution that perturbs the value based on
the perturbation result of the key is proposed. However,
if a user reports a key that does not exist in his local
data, a fake value has to be generated to guarantee the
indistinguishability.
Ye et al. [54] propose to generate the fake value
randomly from [−1, 1] at beginning, and then iteratively
update the fake value to improve the estimation of the
mean value. Gu et al. [55] generate the fake values as −1 or
1 with probability 0.5 respectively, the expectation of which
is zero and has no contribution to the value summation
statistically. Besides, they proposed an optimized privacy
budget allocation scheme to improve the utility further. Sun
et al. [56] propose a new idea in their preprint article. They
encode the continuous numerical value as two extreme
values −1 and 1, then randomly sample the value from
the perturbed space, which constructed by all the possible
combinations between the key and the value. To make
full use of the original pairs, Gu et al. [55] propose to use
padding and sampling protocol [28] instead of sampling
the pair directly from the domain.
Summary. There are two new problems need to be
solved in key-value data statistic. One is how to keep the
correlation between the key and the value. The second
problem is how to generate fake value with a minimal
impact on the final statistical results. Table 10 illustrates the
advantages and disadvantages of current solutions.
3.3 Range query estimation
A range query counts the fraction of a population having
the value within a specified interval. For example, ’What
percentage of people are between the ages of 30 and
40?’. The query can be estimated directly via point
estimates. That is the aggregator simply sums up estimated
frequencies for every item (30, 31, ..., 40) in the range.
This works tolerably well for short ranges over small
domains, but rapidly degenerates for larger inputs due to
the accumulated variance. As the variance grows linearly
with the interval size. Assume the statistical variance of
each point is V ar, the variance of a range with length m is
m · V ar. Currently, the main method to solve this problem
is hierarchy-based method, which bounds the variance by a
polylogarithm of the length of the range.
Hierarchy-interval method. The general idea of hierarchy-
interval based method is to construct a b-ary tree of height
h. Each node corresponds to an interval, and has b children,
which corresponds to b equally sized subintervals. The
users are randomly partitioned into h groups, the users
in group Gi report to the nodes in level i. The aggregator
estimates the fraction of the input at each node and
answers the range queries by aggregating the nodes from
the decomposition of the range. Hierarchy-interval based
method rescales the error logarithmically with the length of
the range. That is, compared with naive method, it reduces
the variance from O(m) · V ar to O(logbm) · V ar.
Cormode et al. [57, 58] first discuss the range query
under local differential privacy setting. They utilized B-
adic intervals to decompose the data domain and further
improved the accuracy by post-processing the result that
makes the number of child nodes sum to the number of the
parent node. Wang et al. [59] discuss the problem of multi-
dimensional analytical queries. For example,
SELECT COUNT(*)
FROM D
WHERE Age ∈ [30, 40] AND Salary ∈ [50K, 150K]
They applied the Hierarchical-interval method to each at-
tribute. Therefore, the worst-case squared error for d ordinal
dimensions is reduced from O(md) to O(logdm). Based
on the proposed algorithm in [59] for answering multi-
dimensional analytical queries, they proposed and demon-
strated a middleware solution DPSAaS, which provides dif-
ferentially private data-sharing-and-analytics functionality
as cloud services [60].
Hierarchy-coefficient method. Haar wavelet transforms
(HWT) [61], a popular technique for processing one-
dimensional ordinal data, has been used to summarize data
for the purpose of answering range queries [62]. Specifically,
given a vector t with length m, HWT wavelet constructs a
binary tree with logm levels. The leaves are corresponding
to the entries in t. It then generates a wavelet coefficient c
for each internal node, such that c = cl−cr2 , where cl(cr) is
the average value of the leaves in the left (right) subtree. An
additional coefficient c0 (referred to as the base coefficient)
is produced by taking the mean of all leaves. Given the
Haar wavelet coefficients, any entry v in t can be easily
reconstructed by following equation.
v = c0 +
l∑
i=1
(gi · ci), (5)
where ci is the ancestor of v at level i, and gi equals
1(−1) if v is in the left (right) subtree of ci. Similar to
Hierarchy-interval method, Cormode et al. [58] let each
user choose one level to report and use HRR to perturb
the coefficient. The noisy coefficient is collected to estimate
the count of the item. The range query can be answered
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TABLE 10: Comparison of Key-value data statistical methods
Method Typical paper Key points Advantages Disadvantages
Perturb the value
based on the
perturbation result
of the key
PrivKVM [54]
• Generate fake value
randomly from [−1, 1]
• Iteratively update fake value
as the estimated mean value
• Unbiased mean value estimation •Multiple rounds iteration
PCKV [55]
• Generate fake value as either
1 or −1
• Utilize tight budget
composition and optimized
budget allocation
• Fake values achieves expected
zero summation without iteration
• Less privacy budget consumption
• Big variance for a smaller
population
by simply summing the count of all items in the range,
which needs at most 2h coefficients. Therefore, the variance
of the query result is also bounded by a polylogarithm of m.
Summary. Range query is a very common database
operation that retrieves the recodes where some value
within an interval. Simply aggregate the point estimate
results in big statistical variance, hierarchy-based method is
the only way to solve this problem under LDP protection
in the literature. More structure of data storage that might
contribute to the range estimation needs to be explored.
3.4 Summary of statistical query with LDP
We discussed three types of statistical queries, frequency
estimation, mean value estimation and range query. Fre-
quency estimation is the most common query and aim at
categorical data, we include the frequency estimation for
the single attribute, multiple attributes and set-value data.
Two main problems have to be considers when estimate
the item frequency, the effect of high dimensional data
and statistical efficiency. Decreasing the data dimension and
sampling are two important measures to deal with the
high dimensional dataset. The principle of improving the
efficiency is avoid going through all the items in the domain.
Mean value estimation aims at the statistics for continuous
numerical attribute. The research focus is on how to reduce
the statistic variance as well. However, only query mean
value is insufficient in many data analysis tasks. Researchers
have to provide solutions answer more type of queries over
numerical data, such as min and median. Range query is a
generalized frequency estimation that queries the frequency
of many points within the range. Hierarchy-based method
is the core solution, whose essence is to reduce the data
dimension to save privacy budget.
4 PRIVATE LEARNING WITH LDP
Machine learning is an essential method of data analysis.
Instead of answering simple statistical query, the aggregator
has a clear data analysis target that can be achieved by
training a corresponding machine learning model. Accord-
ing to the different algorithms, the user incorporates the
LDP perturbation mechanism to the model training process,
which is separated to supervised learning and unsupervised
learning. Another group of research consider the learning
process as an optimization problem, which is solved by
defining a series of objective functions. We group these
research as private learning in ERM.
4.1 Supervised learning
Supervised learning refers to the machine learning algo-
rithms that learn a model mapping an input to an output
based on a set of labelled training datasets. Naive Bayes
classifier is one of the most simple and effective supervised
learning techniques in data mining. It is a probabilistic
classifier that makes classifications using the maximum a
posteriori decision rule in a Bayesian setting. Given a class
label c ∈ C and a conjunction of features [x1, · · ·xd], the new
instance is classified as the most probable label c∗, where
c∗ = argmax
c∈C
{P (c)
d∏
i=1
P (xi|c)} (6)
P (c) is distribution probability, xi is the value for ith
attribute. Naive Bayes classifier is trained based on the
statistics of conditional distribution of the feature and label.
Naive Bayes classifier adopts attribute conditional indepen-
dence assumption that the attributes are independent to
each other.
Two issues have to be considered to train a Naive Bayes
classifier under local setting. The first issue is that the
data dimension can be quite high. This issue is solved by
partitioning the users into different groups, and users in
each group report a pair of values (one attribute and the
label). The second issue is that the correlation between
the attributes and label needs to be preserved. Yilmaz et
al. [44] transform two attributes to one attribute, apply
the frequency oracle to estimate the frequency and then
calculate the conditional probability. Xue et al. [63] propose
a similar idea as collecting key-value data that perturbs the
attribute first and then perturbs the label value based on the
attribute perturbation result.
Discussion. Simply partition the population to reduce the
effect of high dimensional dataset is not optimal usually, as
the population reporting the same attribute and label would
be quite small with the increasing of the attribute dimension,
which would reduce the statistical accuracy. Besides, Xue
et al.’s method is essentially the same thing as Yilam et
al.’s. They did not show the advantage of the method that
perturb the label value based on the attribute perturbation
result compared with the method apply frequency oracle
directly. Assume both of them adopt GRR as the building
block, they achieve the same statistical variance. Table 11
compares these two methods. There’s still plenty of room to
improve for Naive Bayes model training under local setting.
4.2 Unsupervised learning
Unsupervised learning refers to machine learning algo-
rithms that get inferences from datasets with no pre-existing
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TABLE 11: Comparision of supervised learning methods
Typical papers Method Advantages Disadvantages
[44] Bind two attributes as one, thenapply the general FO
Support both numerical and
categorical attributes High statistical variance
[63] Perturb the value sequentiallyusing subset selection method Much accurate statistics
High communication cost and only sup-
port categorical attributes
TABLE 12: Comparision of unsupervised learning methods
Method Description Typicalpapers Advantages Disadvantages
Hashing
Hash the data record using lo-
cality sensitive hash function
and add noise to each user’s
data point
[64],
[65],
[66]
Only need a few round of itera-
tion Has a high noise
Bit vector
Map the data record into the
Hamming space and perform
the randomized response to
each bit of the encoded vector
[67] Data dimension can be rela-tively reduced
Extra computation cost to make the
distance consistent, and cannot achieve
strict -LDP definition
Transformation
Encode the data record as a bi-
nary string, and then perform
the randomized response to the
generated string and report the
closest center differential pri-
vately
[68] The user’s clustering informa-tion is protected
Not suitable for high dimensional data,
and extra privacy consumption for clus-
ter center selection
labels As a typical unsupervised learning algorithm, clus-
tering divides the unlabelled data record into a number
of groups such that the data records are similar to each
other in the same group. Specifically, given a set of data
point {r1, · · · , rn}, the output of clustering is a set of group
center {c1, · · · , ck} and assigned points. One of the most
fundamental clustering methods, k-means has been studied
in the distributed setting recently.
The basic k-means algorithm works as follows. It creates
k clusters by assigning each point to its closest center
initially, and then re-calculates the center of each cluster
iteratively until no changes happen. To protect the user’s
data locally, the user needs to report their perturbed data
and closest center they belong to to the aggregator in each
iteration. Two issues need to be considered. First, the high
dimensional data causes too much noise added to each
record. Second, the multi-round report weakens the privacy
level. Currently, the research mainly focuses on reducing the
data dimension while maintaining the distance property.
Nissim and Stemmer[64] propose an algorithm for min-
imum enclosing ball, they make use of an LDP algorithm
called GoodCenters, which works by hashing input points
using a locality sensitive hash function to maximize the
probability of a collision for close items, while minimizing
the probability of collision for far items. Later Stemmer and
Kaplan [65] propose an improved algorithm for distributed
K-means that significantly reduces the number of interaction
rounds. Moreover, a new locally private k-means algorithm
[66] is proposed recently, which further reduces the additive
error in their work. Sun et al. [67] use Bit Vector mechanism
to encode the user data into Hamming space, which elimi-
nates the semantic information while preserving the initial
distance between records. Then the traditional randomized
response is performed on each bit of the data to ensure the
indistinguishability. Xia et al. [68] propose a feature transfor-
mation method that encodes the user’s data as a production
of a binary string with a coefficient, which provides a trade-
off between accuracy, communication costs, and privacy. To
enhance the privacy and hide the cluster each user belongs
to, the user’s closest center is perturbed by the LDP protocol
as well. Table 12 compares these methods in regard to
different encoding mechanisms.
Discussion. The mean value of data in each dimension
is usually calculated as the new center in each cluster.
However, the population can affect the accuracy of the cal-
culation significantly. The statistics for clusters with a small
population would have a big variance. The strategy to solve
this problem needs to be explored in the future. Besides,
though some researchers [65] try to reduce the iteration
round, reducing the privacy consumption in distributed
clustering remains a challenge.
4.3 Private learning in ERM
The purpose of private learning framework is to design
a private learner that outputs an approximately accurate
model and preserve the differential privacy of the training
samples. Empirical risk minimization (ERM) is a typical
technique used to select the optimal model from a set of
hypotheses.
Given a dataset D = {r1, · · · , rn}, hypothesis h ∈ H and
loss function `(h(w, ri), yi), the goal of empirical risk min-
imization is to identify the w that minimizes the empirical
risk Rn(w) on dataset D shown in Eq. 7.
Rn(w) = argmin
h∈H
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(h(w, ri), yi) (7)
The utility of private ERM is measured by the differ-
ence between the real risk Rn(w) and private risk Rˆn(w),
defined as a risk bound, or the sample complexity that the
number of samples are needed to achieve a bounded accu-
racy. Both of which can be considered as implementation of
Eq. 8.
Pr[|M(D)− Mˆ(D)|≤ α] > 1− β (8)
ERM can be implemented for certain learning tasks by
choosing different loss functions. For example, linear regres-
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TABLE 13: Private learning risk bound
Paper Model Learningalgorithm
Assumption for
loss function
Perturbation
method Risk bound/Sample complexity
Privacy
level
[69] Non-interactive –
1 Convex, 1-
Lipschitz Gradient Exponentially depend on d 
[70] Non-interactive
Sparse linear
regression Convex Input Logarithmically depend on d (, δ)
Kernel ridge
regression
Convex,
Lipschitz Input Polynomial dependences on d (, δ)
–
Convex,
smooth
generalized
linear function
Input -/Quasi-polynomial with respect to 1
α
(, δ)
[71] Non-interactive
– (∞, T )-smooth Objective -/Polynomially dependent on
1
α
for
constant or low dimensional case

–
Convex,
generalized
linear function,
1-Lipschitz
Objective depend on n and Gaussian width of theconstrained set 
[72], [73]
Non-
interactive
Sparse linear
regression – Input Depends on d log d 
Interactive Sparse linearregression – Gradient
Depends on log d for low dimensional
case 
Interactive Sparse linearregression – Input
Depends on log d if only the lables are
required to be private (, δ)
1 –: Not specified
sion defined the loss function as maximum likelihood esti-
mation, while logistic regression defined the loss function as
the logistic loss. If the task is simple statistical analysis, such
as mean or median statistic, the loss function is simplified
to `(θ, ri), where θ is the estimated value. ERM is used to
minimize the empirical risk Lˆ = 1n
n∑
i=1
`(θ, ri). To make the
ERM solution tractable, the loss function is usually assumed
to be convex, therefore, minimize the empirical risk can be
considered as a convex optimization problem.
ERM under local differential privacy includes two kinds
of protocols, interactive and non-interactive. The interactive
model allows the aggregator to collect the data sequentially,
the reported value of ui is based on user ui’s true value
and user ui−1 perturbed value. The non-interactive model
requires the data to be collected at once. Currently, the
majority of the work of statistical analysis uses the non-
interactive model. Three methods are considered to incor-
porate differential privacy into the learning process: input
perturbation, gradient perturbation, and objective perturba-
tion. The input perturbation inserts the noise into the data
record directly. The gradient perturbation adds the noise to
the gradient generated by the gradient descent optimization
algorithm, while objective perturbation adds noise to the
objective function prior to learning.
Kasiviswanathan et al. [7] initiate the study of private
local learning under the interactive model. Later, Feldman
et al. [74] propose a wide range of convex ERM problems
for statistical query and Duchi et al. [14, 48] give optimal
upper and lower bounds. Paper [69–71] study the con-
vex optimization problem under the non-interactive model.
Smith et al. [69] focus on convex Lipschitz functions and
presented a result that the sample size is exponentially
dependent on the dimensionality d. Wang et al. [71] show
that in the case of constant or low dimensions, if the loss
function is (∞, T )-smooth, the exponential dependency can
be avoided. In the high dimensional case, if the loss function
is a convex generalized linear function, the error can be
bounded by the Gaussian Width of C and n instead of d.
Zhang et al. [70] study some specific loss functions under
high-dimensional space, such as spare linear regression and
kernel ridge regression, and prove the polynomial depen-
dence of excess risk or square error over log d and 1n . Wang
et al. [72, 73] study Empirical Risk Minimization problem
with sparsity constraints, and achieved an upper bound that
depends only logarithmically on d. Van et al. [75] extend the
local differential privacy framework in unconstrained online
convex optimization by allowing the provider of the data to
choose their privacy guarantees.
Discussion. The risk bounds of ERM are highly associated
with the dimension of the data and the size of the training
samples. Though researchers try to relax the dependency
by both adding extra assumptions and relaxation of the
privacy level, the polynomial dependency seems still cannot
be avoided. Besides, the constraints to the loss function
might hinder the practical development of the private learn-
ing framework. We summarise the risk bounds of private
learning algorithms in Table 13.
4.4 Summary of private learning with LDP
Machine learning is an essential method of data analysis
used to design a model to learn the trend and dependence
between attributes and target variable. Due to the high
dimensional user data and many rounds of iteration, it’s
difficult to train an accurate model with a high level of
privacy guarantee. Distributed environment makes it even
more challenging.
Naive Bayes classification and decision tree are two
popular and simple supervised learning algorithms. Besides
reducing the added noise, the correlation between the at-
tributes and label needs to be preserved. Currently, partition
users or attributes to save privacy budget is the only way in
the literature to enhance the model accuracy for Naive Bayes
classification. Decision tree learning has not been studied in
the local model yet.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 15
TABLE 14: Practical Deployment
Company Deployment Purpose/Functionality Techniques Population Parameters Limitations Opensource
Google
Chrome
Browser
(2014)
Collect up-to-date
statistics about the
activity of their users
and their client-side
software
2-level RR
memoization
Bloom filter
14 million
 = 0.5343
h1= 2
k2= 128
Not suitable for data
with frequent changes Yes
Apple macOiOS10 (2016)
Estimate the frequen-
cies of elements
RR
CMS
HT3
Hundreds
of millions
 = 2 ∼ 8
m4= 256 ∼ 32768
h = 1024 ∼ 65536
The overall privacy cost
for each device is un-
bounded
No
Microsoft Windows 10(2017)
Repeated collection
of counter data
mean estimation
histogram estimation
1BitMean
dBitFlip
α-point rounding
memoization
millions  = 1 Not suitable for datawith significant changes No
SAP HANA 2.0SPS03 (2018)
Count
Sum
Average
LM5 –
Leave it up to
the data con-
sumer
Only support numerical
value The added noise
is unbounded
No
1 h number of hash functions
2 k Bloom filter size
4 m CMS size
3 HT Hadamard transform
5 LMLaplace mechanism
Clustering is a typical unsupervised learning algorithm.
Users need to cooperate with the aggregator to update the
centers iteratively. Though several works try to reduce the
iterative round to save privacy budget, it is challenging to
reduce it to one round. Another effective way to enhance
the accuracy is to reduce the data dimension. The essential
challenge for this method is how to maintain the distance
between records while doing the dimension reduction. Sev-
eral methods have been proposed but there is still room
for further improvement, especially for the process of the
protection for the data center that the data record belongs
to.
Private learning combines differential privacy and vari-
ous learning algorithms to train a model while preserving
the training samples. ERM helps to select the optimal model
by transferring the learning problem to convex optimization
problem. PAC theory builds the relationship between the
sample complexity and model accuracy, which is highly
related to the data dimension. Researchers are trying to relax
the dependency on data dimension and narrow the sample
complexity gap between the interactive and non-interactive
model by adding the extra constraint to the object function,
which makes it impractical for real applications.
5 APPLICATIONS OF LOCAL DIFFERENTIAL PRI-
VACY
5.1 Applications in practice
Google proposed RAPPOR in 2014, and deployed it to
the Chrome Web browser to collect the clients’ preferences
(e.g. default home page and search engine), which is the
first internet-scale deployment of LDP. As aforementioned,
RAPPOR hashes the item into a short bit vector and per-
forms the randomized response to each bit of the vector. To
relieve the collision problem, they utilize Bloom filter and
cohort methods to introduce the redundancy to improve
the false positive rate. The decoding process of RAPPOR
is quite complicated, which requires sophisticated statisti-
cal techniques and inefficient. RAPPOR supports multiple
collections of the data from the same respondent over time.
The idea is memoization that instead of directly reporting
the perturbed value B′ on every request, the client reports
a randomized version of B′. The advantage is that it pro-
vides longitudinal privacy, but it is only in cases when the
user’s value does not change or changes in an uncorrelated
fashion.
Apple launched LDP for the first time in macOS Sierra
and iOS 10 to protect the user’s activity while providing the
QuickType and emoji suggestions. The general idea is that
the users’ data with the varying size is encoded as matrix of
fixed size using Count Mean Sketch (CMS) technique. Then
the Hadamard basis transformation is applied to the hashed
encoding. Instead of sending the entire row to the server,
only a single bit is sampled at random to send to the server.
This reduces the communication cost at the expense of some
accuracy. The deployed LDP algorithm does not consider
the privacy cost for repeat collection. Instead, they set a
limit on the number of records that can be collected for each
use case. To trade-off utility with privacy budget, device
bandwidth, and server computation cost, the parameters are
selected based on the effect of them to the variance of the
estimated counts.
Microsoft deployed LDP to Windows 10 from 2017 to
collect the number of seconds that a user has spent using a
particular app. The proposed privacy framework is similar
to RAPPOR. Memoization is also used for continual collec-
tion. The difference is that α-point rounding mechanism
is proposed, which enable slight changes in user’s data
without violation of predefined privacy. The key idea is
to discretize the domain, then the values stay within a
single segment trigger the same memorized response. But
it is not working for the situation that the value changes
significantly.
SAP integrates privacy-enhancing techniques into
database management system SAP HANA since 2018. Dif-
ferent from other privacy-enhanced database management
platform that adopts centralized differential privacy, such as
PINQ [76], SAP adopts local differential privacy to avoid the
hassle and overhead of maintaining a privacy budget. The
general idea is that transform the dataset by adding Laplace
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noise to each record of the specified column of the dataset
before performing any query. The system utilizes seed to
make the noisy result reproducible if no changes have
occurred to the database. The content of privacy view in the
system is always recalculated to check whether or not any
changes result in violations of the current privacy definition.
The privacy enhanced system let the data consumer set the
privacy parameter. SAP HANA is claimed to be the first
data management production that addresses data privacy
through an integrated and domain independent approach.
It provides an easy-to-use solution, but we see the potential
for further improvements. For example, the noise added
to the database is unbounded, the solution is only suitable
for numerical attributes, and the supported query types are
limited.
Discussion. The practical deployment of LDP currently
is limited to the count and average functions. Deploying
LDP in practice is quite challenging. First, there is limited
experience on how to determine the privacy level. Since the
utility requirements predominately depend on the applica-
tion and the selection of the privacy level is based on the
privacy characteristics of the underlying dataset for each
use case. How can we well balance the privacy and utility?
Current practice is to choose the parameter according to the
limited experience or run a number of simulations over a
small set of datasets to find how the parameters affect the
performance to make the selection. The general range of 
is [0.1 ∼ 10]. Second, the privacy level is unbounded due
to the continuous collection. Because of the sequential com-
bination property of differential privacy, the privacy level
becomes weaker and weaker as the increasing of the number
of query times. Memoization is the only way to prevent
such averaging attack. However, the drawback is that the
user’s data cannot be changed or change significantly, which
makes continuous statistic meaningless.
5.2 Applications in various domain
5.2.1 Federated learning
Federated learning, which proposed by Google in 2017 [77],
is a recent advance in privacy-preserving machine learning,
where the model enables the mobile phone to learn from
its local data and only the parameters are sent to the server
for global model training. Distributed stochastic gradient
descent (SGD) is commonly adopted in federated learning
for training machine learning models.
Though the users’ data do not leave their own devices,
the adversaries can use differential attacks to determine
which mobile users have been included during the learning
process [78, 79] and the novel discrimination on client
identity enables the generator to recover user specified
private data [80]. For example, Nesterov [81] demonstrate
that the model-inversion attack can recover the images in
the facial recognition system and Shokri et al. [82] show the
vulnerability of deep learning models trained on sensitive
data for membership inference even when the sensitive data
are released as black box models.
To prevent the attack from the adversaries, algorithms
using differential privacy for distributed learning have been
proposed [83–87]. The main idea is to add the calibrated
Gaussian noise to the parameter reported to the server at
the user side to balance privacy and predictive accuracy. The
majority of the work only protect the record-level privacy.
However, McMahan et al. [83] claim that for problems like
language modelling, protecting the single record is insuffi-
cient. Because the sensitive word maybe typed several time,
all of which should be protected. Therefore, they proposed
to add user-level privacy (LDP) protection to the federated
averaging algorithms. Besides adding Laplace or Gaussian
noise, randomized response is used in private federated
learning as well. For example, Wang et al. [49, 88] utilize the
proposed mean value perturbation mechanism to perturb
the gradient to ensure the unbiased mean value estimation
under federated learning framework. Chamikara et al. [89]
apply randomized response to local deep learning training.
Specifically, they divide the structure of a convolutional neu-
ral network into two main modules, convolutional module
and ANN module, and introduce an intermediate random-
ization layer which is named as LATENT in between these
two modules. LATENT converts the input values to binary
values and then performs the randomized response.
Discussion. LDP provides much stronger privacy protec-
tion for users during training process. While McMahan et
al. show that the model trained with strong privacy guaran-
tees (user-level privacy), showing no significant decrease in
model accuracy given a large enough dataset. The problem
is that does LDP provides too strong privacy in practice
at the cost of other resource consumption. Besides, some
unique issues of federate learning model need to be consid-
ered when combining with privacy-preserving technology,
such as the communication efficiency and power limitation
of mobile devices. Because more round of iterations may
need to reach convergence due to the involvement of differ-
ential privacy.
5.2.2 Reinforcement learning
Reinforcement Learning is a type of machine learning tech-
nique that enables an agent to learn in an interactive envi-
ronment. It has been well adopted in artificial intelligence
(AI) as a way of directing unsupervised machine learning
through rewards and penalties in a given environment.
While the environment may be related to some private
information, such as the private indoor layout. Pan et al. [90]
show the vulnerability of reinforcement learning to potential
privacy-leaking attacks, and they recover the map structure
successfully.
Ono et al. [91] propose a local differential privacy algo-
rithm based on asynchronous advantage actor-critic (A3C)
for distributed reinforcement learning to obtain a robust
policy. They propose a Laplace method and a random
projection method to introduce the randomness to the dis-
tributed gradient that satisfies LDP to prevent information
disclosure. Gajane et al. [92] initiate the study of the LDP
multi-armed bandit problems and proposed an LDP bandit
algorithm to hide the reward, which is considered refer to
the users’ activates that involve private information. Basu
et al. [93] provide a unified framework to prove minimax
lower bounds on the regret of both differentially private
multi-armed bandits, and they show that when differential
privacy is achieved using a local mechanism, the regret
scales as a multiplicative factor of . Latter, Ren et al.
[94] prove a much tighter regret low bound and develop
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 17
corresponding LDP upper confidence bound algorithm by
adding Laplace noise to the reward or converting the re-
wards to Bernoulli responses.
Discussion. Artificial intelligence has attracted a large
amount of attention in recent years. Zhu and Yu [95]
explored the possibility of applying differential privacy
mechanism in AI. And we also see the potential of LDP,
which comply with the setting of multi-agent system and
distributed learning quite well. The application of LDP in
this area is at a very early stage. More research is needed to
help us to understand the functionality and effect of LDP in
reinforcement learning.
5.2.3 Social network
Online social networks provide an unprecedented opportu-
nity for researchers to analysis various social phenomena.
These network data is normally represented as graphs,
which contain many sensitive individual information [96].
To protect the privacy, a synthetic social graph is released
instead of the original one. The synthetic graph generation
algorithm includes Erdos-Renyi [97], Chung-Lu [98], Kro-
necker [99], BTER [100] and so on, which takes some graph
statistical information as input, such as node degrees, and
some high-level structural properties of the input graph.
Besides the high dimensional problem, two additional chal-
lenges have to be considered when developing the solutions
to protect the user’s privacy under local differential privacy
protection.
• First, the current study of local differential privacy
mainly focus on some simple statistic, such as count
and mean. While more detailed information, such as
edge-level information, are needed to fit the graph
generation models.
• Second, each user only has a local view of the group,
it is difficult to obtain the global information of the
entire graph, such as the submatrix of the adjacency
matrix in Kronecker Graph model.
Therefore, how to reduce the impact of high dimensional
data and how to utilize simple statistics to obtain more
graph information are two major research questions under
local differential privacy protection. Qin et al. [101] parti-
tion the users into disjoint groups, where similar users are
grouped together. They obtain more structural information
from each user by building node-to-group connectivity.
Instead of collecting the statistic information (the number
of connections) for each user. Zhang et al. [102] let the user
report a random neighbour list. To defend the drawback of
applying randomized response directly, they partition the
users into disjoint groups according to their similarity as
well. Only the nodes in the same group are included in the
neighbour list, which significantly narrows down the range
of the randomized response. Besides, Sun et al. [103] argue
that the traditional local differential privacy definition can
only protect the user, but not the user’s neighbours. To solve
this problem, they proposed a new concept, Decentralized
Differential Privacy (DPP), to protect all graph participants.
Discussion. The essential challenge for graph publication
under local model is to get as much structural information
as possible with the limited view. Currently, only edge
local differential privacy is considered under local model.
Node privacy is quite challenging in centralized model, the
distributed environment makes it more difficult.
5.2.4 Location privacy
GPS-enabled devices allow the location information to be
easily collected and provide opportunities for the develop-
ment of location-based services, such as tracking system,
social network services, and location-based advertising. Not
alone the location information, the user’s home address,
his religious practice, behaviour, and habits can be dis-
closed. LDP has been used to collect the user’s location
data and statistic the population distribution. The location
data is treated as a categorical attribute instead of numerical
value. Similar to the general high-dimensional categorical
attribute, location data has a large domain size. Another
character of location data is that the location is easy to be
generalized to a larger region. The statistics of the popula-
tion in a specific region is a typical range query. Therefore,
the hierarchy tree is used as a common tool to generalize the
location and reduce the statistical variance.
Let the root node be the highest level of the tree, which
includes all the locations of the universe. Zhao et al. [104]
iteratively split the node into disjoint sub-partitions with
more detailed representations in a top-down manner based
on the noisy count of the node. And make use of the noisy
count of each leaf node to construct the synthetic dataset.
Chen et al. [105] allow the user to choose a safe region (the
internal node in the tree) to report, which has a much lower
statistical variance compared with reporting the location in
the lowest level. Kim et al. [106] consider the workload-
aware indoor positioning data collection. They let the user
report a binary vector, which includes part of the path
sequence, to statistic the noisy count of all the nodes in the
tree.
Discussion. Even though previous works provide various
solutions to location privacy, they mainly focus on the popu-
lation statistics, location privacy issues in other applications
have not been considered under local differential privacy
protection. For example, providing recommendations about
nearby points of interest without disclosing the user’s loca-
tion and allowing effective task assignments in the spatial
crowdsourcing system.
5.2.5 Recommendation system
Recommendation system is one of the most popular ap-
plications in e-commerce and online social networks [107].
It predicts the ratings or preferences a user would give
to an item utilizing the user’s past behaviour as well as
similar decisions made by other users. However, continual
observation of the recommendations with some background
information enables an adversary to infer the individual’s
rating or purchase history [108].
Matrix factorization is a class of collaborative filtering
algorithms, which is one of the most widely used techniques
in recommendation system. Each user i is characterized by
a profile vector ui ∈ Rd, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and each item j is
characterized by a profile vector vj ∈ Rd, 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
User i’s rating of item j, which is denoted by rij , is then
approximated by the inner product of ui and vj . That is
rij
.
= uTi vj . Matrix factorization computes the user profiles
ui and the item profiles vj by minimizing the regularized
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mean squared error on the set of known ratings. While
gradient descent is one of the popular approaches to solve
the nonconvex optimization problem. It iteratively learns
the ui and vi based on some updating rules. As profile
vector ui only relies on user i’s own ratings, the user profiles
ui can be computed in user’s devices without reporting
any data to the recommender when the vi are shared by
the recommender. While the vi can be updated by the
aggregator by collecting the gradients from users. Therefore,
the user can protect their data by perturbing the gradient
before sending it to the server to satisfy local differential
privacy.
Shin et al. [109] protect the items and ratings by using
randomized response and Harmony respectively. Jiang et
al. [110] apply two times randomized response as RAPPOR
to prevent the rated items from being disclosed and adding
Gaussian noise to hide the rating. As the number of items
is very big, and the calculation takes multiple iterations,
applying the general randomized response to each value re-
sults in unacceptable estimation error. Shin et al. [109] utilize
dimension reduction and sampling methods to improve the
recommendation accuracy. Besides, many other works [111–
115] try to prevent the user’s data from being disclosed to
the untrusted server as well. They protect the user’s ratings
[113] or items [114, 115] by adding Laplace noise, which
provides privacy for a single rating or item instead of the
whole data record.
Discussion. Rating dataset is high sparse. In practice,
the recommendation based on the original dataset is not
very accurate due to the missing values. However, some
randomized algorithms can improve the accuracy of the
recommendation. For example, Yang et al. [116] utilize
Johnson-lindenstrauss transform to get a much accurate rec-
ommendation even compared with non-privacy method in
the centralized model. Therefore, such randomized methods
might be used to reduce the impact of the large noised
added under the local model. Not only because filled miss-
ing value, but also the reduced dimension.
5.3 Summary
Local differential privacy has not been studied extensively
compared with centralized differential privacy. Part of the
reason for this is that there are intrinsic limitations in what
one can do in the local model. Currently, local differential
privacy mainly focuses on simple statistics, such as fre-
quency estimation, mean value computation, and applica-
tions based on these simple statistics. Though it is rarely
mentioned, the simple private statistic can be potentially
applied to various application areas, such as smart meters
[117–119], smart intelligent transportation system, crowd-
sourcing and medical data analysis [120].
In addition, other applications are also proposed in the
literature. For example, Yang et al. [121] study how to collect
the users’ preference ranking under local DP. Sun et al. [122]
study the truth inference problem on sparse crowdsourcing
data. Private Principal Component Analysis (PCA) problem
has also been studied under both interactive [123, 124]
and non-interactive [125] local model. Recently, Choi et al.
[126] introduce the application of local differential privacy
on Ultra-low power system that supports low resolution
and fixed point hardware. Lyu et al. [127–129] introduce
different LDP protocols to preserve the extracted hidden
representation in deep inference and NLP domain. Paper
[130–133] study hypothesis testing under the local setting.
Local differential privacy still has much unknown poten-
tial, all these mentioned research is a good starting point for
extending the application of local differential privacy in the
future.
6 RESEARCH GAPS AND RESEARCH DIRECTION
Local differential privacy is a relatively new research filed.
Due to its unique properties, LDP has many challenging
problems need to be solved. We identify the research gaps
for LDP and propose a few research directions in this
section.
6.1 Research gaps
There are many problems that have not been well studied
under local differential privacy.
First, as aforementioned, LDP perturbs every data
record, which reduces the statistical accuracy significantly
compared with centralized model. The higher dimensional
dataset makes it even worse. There are quite a lot of research
focus on high dimensional data statistical, the solution in-
cludes partition, hash, and matrix transformation. However,
the majority of exiting solutions are focus on the single
attribute. For the multiple attributes statistics, the general
way is to sample one or few attributes to report, which
inevitably reduces the utility. Therefore, there is still a long
way to go for high dimensional data statistical over multiple
attributes.
Second, the principle of LDP getting accurate statistics is
that the added positive and negative noises can be cancelled
out and the perturbation mechanism is usually designed
based on the predefined query. The bias of the perturbed
data is usually very big. The aggregator is hardly to perform
other types of queries on the collected data. That is, the
data perturbation method is bounded with the predefined
query, the aggregator can only get the accurate estimation
for the specified query. However, supporting multiple types
of query is the fundamental requirement of data analysis,
how to make it achievable and ensure accurate estimation is
quite challenging under local environment.
Third, users’ data change over time and the statistics
change accordingly, which needs to be re-computed peri-
odically in practical. Continuous data statistics have been
studied well under centralized differential privacy model,
but has not been well studied with local differential privacy
protection. Currently, memoization has been proposed in
the literature. However, it is not working for data with fre-
quent changes [8] or data change significantly [10]. Besides,
only Joseph et al. [134] consider the continuous statistic.
But, the proposed voting method is only applicable for
tracking statistical problems for evolving data that the stable
number of users receive new information in each round.
The problem of statistic stream data needs to be further
explored and more practical scenario that both the number
of participated users and user’s value are changed need to
be considered when developing the solutions.
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6.2 Research directions
Besides the research to solve the aforementioned gaps, we
identify a few new research directions shown as follows.
6.2.1 Relaxation of LDP
Local differential privacy provides a very strong privacy
guarantee for any pair of data record. However, in many
applications, some items are not very sensitive for the user
in the data domain. For example, in the geolocation appli-
cation, the user may do not care to disclose the city he lived
in, but hope to hide the precise location where he located at.
Therefore, the locations outside the city he lived in are not
sensitive to him. Similarly, when collecting website visits,
the website type is less sensitive than the particular website.
All these examples motivate the relaxations that incorporate
the application’s context into the privacy definition.
Acharya et al. [135] propose block structured LDP
(BSLDP), which preserves the privacy of items that are
close to each other. Specifically, the model divides the data
domain into various partitions, the element pairs in the
same partition and those in different partition have different
levels of indistinguishability. Gursoy et al. [136] and Alvim
et al.[137] propose metric-based LDP. Metric LDP is a di-
rect extension of dχ-privacy [138] in centralized DP, which
controls the indistinguishability by items’ distance d(, ) in
addition to the privacy budget. Later, Xiang et al. [139]
apply the Metric DP to more analytical tasks, such as linear
counting query and mult-dimensional range query, which
achieve significant gains in utility.
Currently, the relaxation of LDP is mainly aimed at
location dataset. More works need to be done for various
data types and application scenarios. First, how should
we define the privacy that develops the new definition,
which includes identifying the different privacy concern and
how to quantify privacy level. Second, how to design the
randomized algorithm to achieve the new definition and
analyse the sample complexity are also challenging.
6.2.2 Privacy amplification
Privacy amplification refers to the strategy that enhances the
privacy level without or with a very little effect on the data
utility. It enables the algorithm to achieve same privacy level
with much smaller samples or achieve higher accuracy with
same privacy level. Due to a large amount of noise and poor
utility of LDP (especially compared to centralized DP), the
privacy amplification techniques provide possible solutions
for the practical application of LDP.
Shuffling is a typical method, which has been investi-
gated in the literature [140, 141]. It achieves better utility by
relaxing the LDP trust model. The general idea is to insert
a shuffler between users and the server to break the linkage
between the report and the user identification. Erlingsson
et al. [142] prove that if the users send the data with b-
LDP protection, the shuffling step amplifies the privacy
guarantee to be (a, δ)-DP, where a = O(b/
√
n). The
shortcoming of shuffling model is that if the auxiliary server
colludes with the server, the privacy falls back to the original
LDP model, the privacy guarantee is completely broken.
Distributed Differential Privacy (DDP) combined with cryp-
tosystem can be utilized to solve this problem, as evidenced
by [4, 118, 143]. The notion of DDP reflects the fact that the
noise in the target statistic is sourced from multiple parties.
Approaches to DDP that implement an overall additive
noise mechanism by summing the same mechanism run at
each party (typically with less noise) necessitates mecha-
nisms with stable distributions (like Gaussian distribution,
Binomial distribution)—to guarantee proper calibration of
known end-to-end response distribution—and cryptogra-
phy for hiding all but the final result from participants [144].
A more recent work by Wang et al. [145] introduces multiple
auxiliary servers to make this threat more difficult. As long
as the server cannot collude with all the auxiliary servers,
there is still some privacy amplification effect, but this
introduces more communication costs.
This line of research proves that privacy level of LDP can
be affected by extra data processing. Though at early stage,
quantified privacy level for more privacy amplification tech-
niques need to be explored for LDP, such as sub-sampling
[146], iteration [147, 148] and diffusion mechanism [141].
6.2.3 Solutions for small population
Due to large amount of noise added to the whole dataset,
LDP needs a large number of participants to cancel out the
noise to ensure the statistical accuracy. For example, both
Google and Apple’s deployment collects one dozen million
samples. However, small-scale enterprises may not able to
collect such a big volume of samples, and the populations
can be small for some specific applications, such as collect
the people’s distribution at a certain place. Moreover, even
the sample is large, the effective sample size can be reduced
in the high privacy regime. For example, Duchi et al. [14]
state that when  ∈ [0, 2235 ], -local differential privacy
reduces the effective sample size from n to 42n.
Some works [136, 149] try to reduce the sample size
by improve the statistical estimation accuracy. However,
the effect is limited. A possible solution is that combine
with other privacy techniques to protect the user’s data,
which enable less noise added to each data record without
disclosing the privacy. While other problems may intro-
duced for the hybrid method, such as computational and
communication cost might increase. Besides, some hybrid
strategies [150] that enable some users report their true
values to reduce amount of add noise can be explored. The
intuition is that people have different privacy preferences.
We can save a lot of privacy budget from users who are not
care their information or trust the curator. It’s requisite and
challenging to develop specific solutions for applications
with a limited number of participants and fill the gaps in
the theoretical analysis.
7 CONCLUSION
Big Data provides a tremendous amount of detailed data
for organizations to improve decision making. However,
these data are highly sensitive, and the leakage of these data
has received great focus. Localized differential privacy, as a
new privacy protection model after centralized differential
privacy, breaks the assumption that the curator has to be
trusted by perturbing the data before leaving users’ devices.
This paper presents a comprehensive survey of work on
local differential privacy including an overview of the huge
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amount of literature in two major local differential privacy
research streams: the statistic query and private learning.
We identify three general statistic queries, which includes
frequency, mean, and range. We discussed the existing
methods answering these queries, and further analyzed and
compared the typical methods and techniques, which pro-
vide a comparative review for further research. We classify
the research about private learning into supervised learning,
unsupervised learning and private learning in ERM. We
discuss and analyze the research in each category. In addi-
tion, we explored the application and practical deployment
of local differential privacy and proposed future research
directions based on current research status.
The local differential privacy technology is an emerging
research field, the research of it is incomplete, and it still
has much unknown potential. The survey of literature in
this paper provides an overview of existing works and is
intended as a starting point for exploring new challenges in
the future.
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